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1  Introduction
Moore’s Law
　In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel Corporation, 
who was then director of research and development at 
Fairchild Semiconductor, wrote in an article
１
 in the Elec-
tronics magazine, that
The complexity for minimum component costs has 
increased at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year. 
Certainly over the short term this rate can be expected 
to continue, if not increase. Over the longer term, the 
rate of increase is a bit more uncertain, although 
there is no reason to believe it will not remain nearly 
constant for at least ten years.
Complexity, in this case, meant the number of transistors 
integrated on one integrated circuit （IC） chip. In a paper
２
 
at the 1975 IEEE International Electron Devices Meeting 
（IEDM）, Moore wrote that the 65,000-fold increase in 
complexity from the first single transistor planar circuit 
could be attributed to two main factors: 640-fold from 
larger chip area and higher density of finer micro-struc-
tures, and 100-fold from circuit and device advances that 
increased density. He thought that the latter contribu-
tion was approaching a limit “of another factor of four in 
component density,” and hence increase in complexity 
would slow down to two-fold every two years. Despite 
being first to observe the exponential growth in circuit 
complexity, Moore did not offer a deeper analysis.
Dennard Scaling
　Our present day understanding of how IC complexity 
and performance increase with finer minimum feature 
size was first explained by Dennard’s paper
３
  in Oct 1974. 
In his paper, he gave Table 1. He showed that the circuit 
density increased by the square of the scaling factor, k, a 
result that is now known as Dennard’s Scaling. In other 
words, a two-fold increase may be achieved by k=~_2 . In 
most of the literature today, scaling is expressed as the 
factor multiplied to minimum feature size, that is, 1/k or 
approximately 0.7. Thus, Dennard showed quantitatively 
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how Moore’s Law could be achieved, and which proper-
ties should be scaled.
　Despite Dennard’s contribution to our understanding 
of scaling for performance increase, Moore’s Law became 
the name we associate with semiconductor technology 
progress. Carver Mead is credited with coining the term 
“Moore’s Law” but the original article where the term 
was first mentioned had not been located
４
. What is now 
agreed upon is that Mead’s efforts in the early 1970s to 
promote belief in the long-term growth of IC complexity 
using Moore’s plots, was instrumental in popularizing 
Moore’s Law.
　Figure 1 plots the log of the number of transistors in 
high performance microprocessors against the years 
they were announced. The straight line shows the 2-fold 
per 2-year upward trend. In the 1960’s the desk calcula-
tor market drove demand for one chip processors. The 
general purpose 4-bit processor Intel 4004 was developed 
with Japan’s Busicom Corporation. In June 1978, Intel 
announced the 16-bit 8086 and when its variant 8088 was 
chosen for the first IBM PC, Intel won the war to domi-
nate the microprocessor market. On Oct 17, 1985, Intel 
introduced the first 32-bit processor of the 80386 range. 
It had 275,000 transistors at 1.5-µm, and initially operated 
at 16-MHz clock to achieve 5-MIPS performance. The 
original Pentium was introduced on Mar 22, 1993, had 
3.1-M transistors at 0.8-µm, and operated at 66-MHz to 
achieve 112-MIPS. A 4-times increase in clock rate was 
the main contributor to the 7-fold performance increase 
over the 80386. To satisfy demand for greater processing 
upon is that Mead’s efforts in the early 1970s to promote belief in the long-term growth 
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power, scaling of the process technology proceeded rap-
idly for the next few years; 0.35-µm in Mar 1995, 0.25-µm 
in Jan 1998, 0.18-µm in Oct 1999, 0.13-µm in Jul 2001, 
90-nm （140-M transistors） in May 2004, 65-nm in Jan 
2006, 45-nm in Nov 2008, 32-nm in Mar 2010, 22-nm in 
Apr 2012 and 14-nm in Q2 2015, which was equivalent to 
scaling of about 0.735x （almost doubled transistor count） 
every 2 years. Today’s clock rates are often greater than 
3-GHz. Aggressive scaling of process technology （from 
10-µm to 14-nm） enabled higher clock rates （from less 
than 1-MHz to greater than 3-GHz）, wider data/instruc-
tion buses （from 4-bit to 64-bit） and multi-core technol-
ogy （from 1 core to more than 20 cores）, which together 
pushed the performance horizon while keeping costs 
affordable.
Rock’s Law
　In the early 1970s, when minimum feature size was 
larger than 3-µm and complexity was below 100,000 
transistors, fabrication facilities then were relatively 
inexpensive. As scaling progressed, control of defects 
become increasingly important. Expensive clean rooms 
had to be provided. High precision equipment were 
needed to control increasingly tight process tolerances. 
When wiring widths decreased and wiring levels 
increased, new fabrication methods had to be developed 
for passive structures. Active devices went through 
greater changes. The cost of semiconductor fabrication 
plants doubled every four years, reaching US$14b in 
2015, and the phenomenon was given the name Rock’s 
Law or Moore’s Second Law. Although Rock’s Law never 
became as well-known as Moore’s Law, the exploding 
costs of fabrication facilities remains roughly true. The 
high capital expenditures that accompanied each time 
fabrication process was scaled had to be dealt with by 
an approach that also took into consideration factory 
integration.
NTRS, ITRS, and IRDS
　How did the semiconductor industry continuously 
evolve at such a high pace? This paper hypothesizes 
that technology roadmaps born from cooperation among 
members of the semiconductor community played a sig-
nificant role.
　In the early 1990 ’s, the semiconductor industry 
responded to the growing difficulty in sustaining Moore’s 
Law via a concerted effort to keep R&D in all related 
technologies in pace with the trend. A National Technol-
ogy Roadmap for Semiconductors （NTRS
５
） was produced 
in 1994 by the US semiconductor community, and was 
succeeded by an International Technology for Semicon-
ductors （ITRS
６
） after 1998, and the ITRS was succeeded 
by the International Roadmap for Devices and Systems 
（IRDS
７
） after 2015. The NTRS/ITRS/IRDS were the 
master plans that coordinated technology R&D in critical 
technology sectors. For this paper, the common term 
“ST-Roadmaps” will be used to refer to them.
　Whether the ST-Roadmaps had any impact on semi-
conductor technology and business had not been well 
studied. No one can deny that technology has advanced 
tremendously. The world semiconductor market in value 
has grown respectably but not as much as may be 
expected from the number of electronic devices nor the 
global impact on how people work, communicate and 
spend their free time. It is important to clarify for the 
sake of similar future efforts not only whether but how 
the ST-Roadmaps contributed to the semiconductor 
industry’s growth.
　This paper reports on an initial study of the ST-Road-
maps to understand their role as a Management of Tech-
nology （MOT） tool at the industry level. Existing 
literature that examined the ST-Roadmaps mostly dis-
cussed technical details. Schaller 2004
８
, looked at the ST-
Roadmaps as “organized innovation” and their impact on 
semiconductor technology from a theoretical perspective, 
but he did not examine the separation of roadmapping 
from innovation execution, and the total absence of mar-
ket considerations in the ST-Roadmaps, that this author 
believes are central issues.
　In this study, the author examined the history and fea-
tures of the ST-Roadmaps from the published 2-yearly 
revision reports. Technical details are avoided as much 
as possible. The roles of the ST-Roadmaps as a MOT tool 
are analyzed against the background of the semiconduc-
tor business. A case study on the DRAM roadmap is 
used to provide a clearer picture of the dynamics in the 
roadmapping process. The ST-Roadmaps’ effectiveness is 
also examined qualitatively, and observations are noted 
based on the author’s experience in semiconductor 
research. Finally, the special nature of ST-Roadmaps as a 
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tool for MOT at the industry level is discussed.
Paper sections
　Section 2 examines the objectives of the NTRS in the 
initial years, and features of the roadmap that were cen-
tral to its effectiveness. Section 3 reviews in a case study 
the DRAM cell-size roadmap revisions as scaling 
approached physical limits. Various evolutionary changes 
of the ST-Roadmaps in response to market changes are 
also examined. Section 4 summarizes the main successes 
and pitfalls, and finally Section 5 discusses MOT tool fea-
tures of the ST-Roadmaps and concludes.
2  NTRS, ITRS and IRDS
Historical background
　In 1982, the US Semiconductor Industry Association 
（SIA） incorporated the Semiconductor Research Corpo-
ration （SRC） in a cooperative research effort to stop and 
reverse the loss of US technological leadership in semi-
conductors because company-level research duplication 
had become unsustainable. The main rival country then 
was Japan, which had surged forward through its suc-
cessful 5-year research cooperation since 1975 under the 
R&D Consortium for VLSI, especially in larger wafers 
and manufacturing equipment for high quality control. 
SRC saw its mission as follows.
The SRC executes its mission by funding graduate-
level research at North American universities. 
SEMATECH was formed in 1 987 to address 
improvements in domestic manufacturing technology 
by funding the supplier industry to improve the qual-
ity and capabilities of their manufacturing equipment. 
In addition to the SRC and SEMATECH, the semi-
conductor industry, U.S. universities, government 
agencies, and federal and national laboratories all 
participate in finding solutions to semiconductor tech-
nology needs.
　In the mid-1980s Japan overtook the US in market 
share of semiconductors. To counter foreign rivalry, SIA 
believed research funding needed better focus. In 1992, 
the first semiconductor technology roadmap was pre-
pared. In the words from the 1994 NTRS report’s fore-
word:
The complexity of semiconductor technology is 
increasing at such a rapid pace that there is signifi-
cant danger the U.S. industry will not be able to con-
tinue its historical rate of progress without a common 
vision and increased cooperation in precompetitive 
research and development. To meet this challenge, 
the first semiconductor technology roadmap was pre-
pared under the sponsorship of the Semiconductor 
Industry Association （SIA） by the semiconductor 
community in 1992 and distributed in 1993 in two 
documents ... Broad acceptance of the Roadmap has 
rapidly materialized ... The success of these reports 
emphasized the need for continued renewal of a 
national roadmap for semiconductor technology.
“...” is inserted in the above quote in place of omitted 
text.
　From the experience of the first roadmap, SIA 
believed that
The roadmap creation process enables a common 
vision among industry, academia, and government. 
This vision must be nurtured to allow progression 
from academic research through manufacturing of 
commercial products. The Roadmap also provides a 
framework for guiding R&D; all relevant segments of 
the national R&D base can be efficiently enlisted to 
meet the increasingly complex technology needs of the 
semiconductor industry.
　The 1994 NTRS report was followed by the 1997 
NTRS report. In April 1998, realizing that inputs from 
leading researchers around the world could provide bet-
ter guidance for the industry, SIA extended an invitation 
to Europe, Korea, Japan and Taiwan to collaborate in 
producing an ITRS, and the NTRS was discontinued. 
The first output was the ITRS 1998 Update. Subse-
quently, a comprehensive revision was produced every 
other year from 1999 and a minor update of tables in 
between, till 2015 when the ITRS was discontinued. The 
International Roadmap for Devices and Systems （IRDS） 
was started as ITRS 2, with a revamped agenda, and the 
first report was completed in 2017 after 2 years of dis-
cussions.
95Semiconductor Technology Roadmaps
Roadmap Purpose and Deliverables
　By the beginning of the 1990s, semiconductor technol-
ogy had stayed on the trend predicted by Moore’s Law 
for 25 years. Intel was about to introduce the original 
Pentium that contained more than 3-M transistors in 0.8-
µm process. Talk had begun about the looming funda-
mental limits to scaling and, though answers were not 
available yet, questions were articulated. The previous 
25 years, in comparison, probably seemed like a road 
with few bumps. Faced with many uncertainties, the 
purpose of the roadmap was to determine what relevant 
questions must be asked and by when they must be 
answered to maintain complexity growth at the rate of 
Moore’s Law.
　According to the 1994 NTRS report, the roadmap pro-
vided a quality database of needs or requirements on 
technology and a framework by which the semiconduc-
tor community could systematically approach the enor-
mous R&D tasks to meet these needs. The roadmap 
defined these needs by establishing a top-down hierar-
chy of technological requirements. The Overall Roadmap 
Technology Characteristics （ORTC） summarized the top 
level of needs. Lower level technology roadmaps pre-
pared by Technology Work Groups （TWGs） broke down 
ORTC needs into greater detail specific to each technol-
ogy area. For the 1994 roadmap, each TWG was respon-
sible for also defining the needs of its area for crosscut 
technologies that overlapped many TWGs. These “needs” 
were the roadmap deliverables.
Roadmap Coordinating Group Organization 
Structure
　For the 1994 NTRC, technology requirements were 
divided into eight groups. Each group was assigned a 
TWG comprising top experts in the respective technol-
ogy area. A Roadmap Coordinating Group （RCG） headed 
the organization. The TWGs for fabrication processes, 
in the order semiconductors were fabricated, were 1） 
Materials and Bulk Processes, 2） Process Integration, 
Devices, and Structures （PIDS）, and 3） Interconnect. 4） 
Lithography concerned technologies for patterning. Non-
fabrication technologies included 5） Design and Test 
（from circuits to systems）, 6） Assembly and Packaging, 
7） Factory Integration, and 8） Environment, Safety, and 
Health （ESH）.
　When the NTRS effort was extended to four other 
regions, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Europe, and became 
ITRS, in addition to TWGs, International Technology 
Work Groups （ITWGs） were formed, which consisted of 
eight Focus ITWGs and four Crosscut ITWGs. Members 
of ITWGs were representatives from regional TWGs. 
Each ITWG received inputs from TWGs for the Road-
map revision. In addition, each TWG organized “sub-
TWG meetings” and public “Roadmap Workshops” in an 
attempt to build the widest possible consensus among 
the global semiconductor community.
Approach
　Each roadmap revision covered a range of 15 years 
from the year of publication, equivalent to 5 generations 
of 3-yearly technology evolutions, and in terms of tech-
nology maturity extended from mass production level in 
the near term to exploratory research level in the far 
term. Each generation is referred to by its technology 
node, or minimum feature size expressed in micrometers 
（µm） or nanometers （nm）, and is roughly equivalent to 
a major change of fabrication process, machinery and 
factory facilities.
　Figure 2 is a conceptual illustration of the division of 
labor and funding over five generations of evolution. It is 
observed that the time range of 15 years was probably 
chosen not randomly but long enough so that the tech-
nologies required near the far end would have no known 
solutions at the start. For this approach to be possible, 
two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, requirement 
projections must be fairly accurate, and secondly, the 
limit of existing solutions must be predictable. Dennard’s 
Scaling allowed satisfaction of both conditions. For the 
first condition, if the same pace of scaling was kept, a 
simple formula predicted minimum dimensions and in 
turn other physical properties. The second condition was 
satisfied by state-of-art knowledge in science and engi-
neering since the effects of scaling, the only variable, 
were relatively well understood. For this strategy of 
scaling to be successful, it can be observed from hind-
sight that the demand for better performance must 
remain strong, and that disruptive innovations do catch 
up. More on these observations will be left to the discus-
sion section.
　In the 1994 NTRS, it was written that “The Roadmap 
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is analogous to paved roads of proven technology, unim-
proved roads of alternative technologies, footpaths 
towards new technologies, and innovative trails yet to be 
blazed.” The first two of the five generations over the 
15-year time range were the “paved roads” that had 
mostly well understood needs. The focus was on qualifi-
cation, a technical jargon that means statistically testing 
fabrication machineries, processes, design tools, test pro-
tocols, and all other components of the mass manufactur-
ing system so as to remove potential problems and to 
ensure production control for high yield. For these two 
generations, the ST-Roadmaps provided definitive infor-
mation on what the industry needed to achieve, and it 
was expected that companies would undertake and fund 
their separate R&D programs.
　The subsequent two generations, third and fourth, 
were the “unimproved roads or footpaths”, for which 
alternative technologies had been discovered but 
required feasibility studies to show proof of concept on 
critical yet unproven elements before large investments 
were made in any one alternative. The primary activity 
expected was directed research for the third generation 
and conceptual research for the fourth. All sectors of the 
semiconductor R&D community would participate in and 
provide funding for research into these technologies.
　The fifth generation and beyond would have many 
technology requirements that had no known solutions 
and awaited “trails to be blazed” where no paved roads 
and only few footpaths existed. A number of significant 
barriers to extension of current technology existed. R&D 
was expected to be dominated by activities to find new 
knowledge and generate new concepts including para-
digm shifts. Funding and research leadership would be 
mainly from the non-industrial community such as uni-
versities, government laboratories and industry consor-
tia.
　Another equally important aim of this approach was to 
maintain good balance between resources allocated to 
the different needs of succeeding generations of technol-
ogy, so that a continuous stream of new innovations 
could be born and nurtured in time to address the chal-
lenging requirements of the future.
Roadmap features
　During the initial years of NTRS, extending the bit 
count of Dynamic Random Access Memory （DRAM） by 
a factor of four every 3 years was set as the target rate 
of technology advance, slower than the rate of Moore’s 
1965 paper but faster than the rate of Moore’s 1975 
paper. The choice of DRAM as pace-setter was probably 
decided by two considerations, 1） less system changes 
were expected so comparison between generations was 
straightforward, and 2） DRAM was expected to lead the 
need for scaling. It would be fairly accurate to take the 
level in the far term. Each generation is referred to by its technology node, or minimum 
feature size expressed in micrometers (m) or nanometers (nm), and is roughly 
equivalent to a major change of fabrication process, machinery and factory facilities. 
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view that the roadmaps of main technology require-
ments were aligned to the DRAM roadmap. The Overall 
Roadmap Technology Characteristics （ORTC） is a table 
of quantitative milestones that summarized the main 
technology requirement targets over 15 years into the 
future. Table 2 is a subset giving only the bit-count or 
transistor density targets for the three main product 
classes: memory, microprocessor and ASIC （Application 
Specific Integrated Circuit）. Most of the other main tech-
nology requirements are features that affected perfor-
mance such as number of chip I/Os, chip frequency, 
maximum number of wiring levels, maximum power, and 
power supply voltage, features that affected yield such 
as electrical defect density and features that affected 
costs such as minimum mask count, maximum wafer 
diameter, chip size, and design and test.
　Each main technology requirement had one or more 
associated quantitative properties that could be used to 
gauge technological difficulty. For example, higher chip 
frequency is more difficult to achieve than lower fre-
quency. Power supply voltage poses increasing difficulty 
if it is lowered. New solutions in circuit design had 
greatly increased the former, whereas the latter required 
fundamental changes to transistor design that reduced 
leakage current. In these examples, the difficulties can be 
assessed quantitatively, for example, using simulation in 
the case of circuit design, and using statistical data in 
the case of transistor properties.
　It is interesting that CMOS was chosen as the only 
process to be considered, because in the early 1990’s it 
was still common wisdom to use other processes for 
higher speed, better noise performance, radio frequency 
circuits and other applications. The rationale given was 
“The primary focus of this Roadmap is on technology 
required for silicon CMOS integrated circuits. These 
products constitute over 75% of the world semiconductor 
market and therefore determine mainstream technology. 
This mainstream provides the primary advancements 
for other semiconductor products, such as compound 
semiconductor, microwave, and linear devices. Therefore, 
the Roadmap serves as a technology guide for all semi-
conductor products.” The wisdom of choosing CMOS 
was proven in later years when integration of complex 
digital circuits with analog/RF circuits on one CMOS 
chip resulted in smaller footprints, and CMOS eventually 
overtook in performance because other processes could 
not follow the same pace of scaling. It was a lucky choice 
that CMOS had a long scaling life.
　〈Redbrick Wall〉
　The target technology requirements at technology 
node years or each year were tabulated, and their readi-
ness grouped under 3 categories indicated by colors, 
white if manufacturable solutions existed and were being 
optimized, yellow if manufacturable solutions were 
known, and red if manufacturable solutions were still 
unknown. The red boxes in a table were trend-stopping 
obstacles and came to be called the redbrick wall. The 
wall of yellow boxes was not similarly called perhaps 
because solutions were known and needed only proof at 
high volume production. Table 3 shows an example from 
the DRAM technology requirements of the PIDS section 
were aligned to the DRAM roadmap. The Overall Roadmap Technology Characteristics 
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of the 2001 ITRS. Looking at the roadmap for DRAM cell 
size requirement, the redbrick wall where no solution 
existed then was still 12 years in the future. It is no coin-
cidence that the readiness grouping corresponds to the 
“paved roads”, “footpaths” and “trails to be blazed” classi-
fication in the description of approach.
　〈Gaps in R&D Effort〉
　The Technology Work Groups （TWGs） for the 1992 
Roadmap （pre-NTRS） brought up the question of tech-
nologies common to several TWGs or needing coordina-
tion between different TWGs. These so-called cross-cut 
technologies were Contamination-free Manufacturing, 
Sensors, Software, Materials, Metrology, Modeling, Stan-
dards, and Quality and Reliability. Each of these had no 
corresponding department-in-charge in industry then, so 
the initial Roadmap organization had no TWG assigned 
to them. As a result, it was noted in the 1994 NTRS, 
these technologies had no management direction nor 
budget, or the person-in-charge had no coordination 
responsibility. For the 1994 NTRS, the TWGs were 
charged to identify cross-cut technology needs related to 
their respective fields. Among the original cross-cut tech-
nologies identified in 1992, Sensors became part of 
Metrology, and Software became part of Modeling. Stan-
dards was added as the 6th field. From the 2001 ITRS, 
they were further reorganized into 3 fields: Yield 
Enhancement, Metrology, and Modeling and Simulation. 
Environment, Safety and Health became the 4th field. 
Each of these cross-cut technology fields was assigned a 
TWG at the regional level and an ITWG at the interna-
tional level.
　The difference in importance that researchers and 
management initially attached to cross-cut technologies 
highlights the dynamics of the roadmap creation process. 
Bottom-up concerns for these non-traditional fields were 
raised and heeded by the NTRS management, resulting 
in the formation of additional TWGs and ITWGs. In a 
factory, provision of these technologies tended to be 
assigned to support-service personnel or a secondary 
responsibility of researchers and designers. By 1992, 
they had become as important as focus technology fields 
Table 3  DRAM Technology Requirements in the 2001 ITRS
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as a result of advances in software tools, metrology, 
greater demand for quality control, and higher aware-
ness for protecting the environment and workers. The 
lesson to be learned is the importance for MOT manag-
ers to be sensitive and flexible also to trends of support-
ing technologies.
　〈Market Drivers〉
　Markets needs were reflected in the identified market 
drivers and their impact on system drivers. In the 1994 
NTRS, only system drivers were differentiated: memory, 
microprocessor and ASIC. Under the topic of Assembly 
and Packaging, because packaging requirements differed, 
5 market application segments were differentiated: com-
modity, hand-held, cost/performance, high-performance, 
and automotive. From the 2001 ITRS, market drivers 
were differentiated for all technology requirements, 
according to application markets （portable and wireless, 
broadband, internet switching, mass storage, consumer, 
computer, and automotive）. In the 2005 ITRS, they were 
regrouped into 6 application markets （portable/con-
sumer, medical, networking and communications, 
defense, office, and automotive） to align with the Interna-
tional Electronics Manufacturing Initiative （iNEMI） 
roadmap. The stated motivation was “introduction of 
new technology solutions is increasingly application-
driven with products for different markets making use of 
different combinations of technologies at different times.” 
It should be noted that the push for product differentia-
tion came from market demand for products in new 
applications, reflecting the industry’s evolution as market 
volume grew, not the result of innovation inspired by 
ITRS.
　Another result of market evolution was the replace-
ment of the system driver category ASIC by ASIC/SoC 
in the 2001 ITRS and by SoC that included ASIC as one 
sub-category again in the 2003 ITRS. “SoC” is the abbre-
viation for System on Chip. It was noted in the 2001 
ITRS that logic densities of ASIC had caught up with 
MPU, custom high-performance ASIC were increasingly 
using tunable standard-cell methodologies that exceled in 
implementation productivity at competitive manufactur-
ing cost, and integration of non-CMOS components was 
growing in demand. Whereas ASIC is a logic circuit that 
is custom-built for better performance than the program-
mable MPU, SoC is a hybrid integration of processor, 
custom logic, analog and other components, and hence, 
SoC requires a much more complex fabrication process.
　〈Funding〉
　Optimization of funding is a key motivation of the ST-
Roadmaps. Two contributions to fund saving were high-
lighted: reduction of duplicate work and reduction of 
false leads.
　The Roadmap provides a framework that can 
enhance collaboration, increase shared knowledge, 
and minimize duplication of efforts. The TWGs can 
assist in these collaborations and can help deduce 
common elements of programs that can be shared. 
For example, researchers could develop a common 
stage for lithography exposure tools for use with sev-
eral light （or energy） sources. In this way, the Road-
map provides an opportunity to conserve research 
funds.
　Early focus on critical elements of innovative 
approaches provides additional opportunities to con-
serve funds. By identifying and focusing early R&D 
on unproven elements of a given approach, the semi-
conductor community can often avoid the significant 
expense of attempting to commercialize approaches 
that cannot work. The TWGs are chartered to con-
sult with researchers at their request to identify key 
concepts that need to be proven before considering a 
proposed solution for commercialization.
　It was also a concern that “certain technology develop-
ments, even though critical to maintaining productivity, 
cannot be adequately funded solely through the commer-
cial sales of products embodying that technology.” Exam-
ples included lithography equipment, and tools for 
computer-aided design, inspection, metrology, etc.
　In the ST-Roadmaps documentation, however, specific 
funding programs were either not documented or left 
out of the roadmap formulating process. One of the rea-
sons may be the stated policy not to specify preferred 
technology solutions so as not to bias the search for solu-
tions. Probably for the same reason, research programs 
were left to industry, academia and government labora-
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tories. The ST-Roadmaps’ impact was not reduced by 
leaving out information about funding. Studies on the 
question of impact on research funding on the semicon-
ductor industry will have to look for evidence elsewhere.
3   DRAM cell size roadmap case study and 
Roadmap evolution history
　〈Case Study: Tuning the roadmap〉
　The pace set by Moore’s Law is undoubtedly 
extremely fast. Technology became outdated rapidly. 
Even experts found it challenging to predict with accu-
racy how quickly advances could be made and the ST-
Roadmaps’ milestones had to be revised.
　Using DRAM cell size as an example, in 2001 the red-
brick wall was a comfortable 12-year distance away. The 
closest yellow box was two years away. In 2003, the clos-
est yellow box and redbrick wall had not retreated and 
milestones were reset to a slower pace. In 2005, mile-
Table 4 Milestones for DRAM cell size from 2001 to 2017
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stones were slowed down further. In 2007, a major 
breakthrough pushed the closest yellow box six years 
away and the redbrick wall was estimated to be 11 years 
away. In 2007 and 2009 consecutively, milestones were 
again revised to increase pace. Contrary to expectation, 
the milestones were again overly ambitious and pace 
had to slow down since 2011. Nevertheless, it is worth-
while to note that the redbrick wall in the 2001 roadmap 
had a known solution by 2007 and was cleared by 2013, 
after 12 years, leaving only the issue of optimizing mass 
production solutions. In contrast, the redbrick wall in the 
2017 IRDS was only four years in the future at the same 
pace. The trend of Moore’s Law finally had to slow 
down.
　In the above example of a breakthrough, it took 12 
years to find a solution and develop the technology for 
mass production. The breakthrough was achieved by a 
radical change of the transistor structure. Because it was 
known in 2001 that scaling alone would not provide a 
solution 12 years later, research started early to find 
alternative solutions. In this case, researchers succeeded 
barely in time. The roadmap served not only as a pace-
maker, but also to identify the limits of existing 
approaches to advance technology.
　〈More-than-Moore〉
　The looming end of Moore’s Law was mentioned in 
the 2003 ITRS and a framework for discussion in depth 
was proposed in the 2005 ITRS. The framework, shown 
in the following figure, envisaged progress along two dif-
ferent axes. The “More Moore” axis was defined in the 
2007 ITRS Roadmap Technology Characteristics Termi-
nology, as having two components, which were, Geomet-
ric Scaling that continuously shrank horizontal and 
vertical feature sizes for greater density and perfor-
mance, and Equivalent Scaling that included 3-dimen-
sional device structure improvements, non-geometric 
process techniques and new materials that improved 
performance. The difference compared to the original 
system drivers, DRAM, MPU and ASIC, was inclusion of 
the essential functions of data storage and digital signal 
processing on a system-on-chip （SoC）, that is, functions 
that belonged to DRAM and ASIC, respectively, were 
integrated onto one chip with the MPU function. The 
second axis “More Than Moore,” defined as the incorpo-
ration into devices of functionalities that do not necessar-
ily scale according to Moore’s Law but provided 
additional value to the customer in different ways, envis-
aged integration within a single package “functional 
requirements, such as power consumption, wireless com-
prov de a solution 12 y s later, research sta ted early to find alternative olutions. In 
this case, researchers succeeded barely in time. The roadmap served not only as a pace-
maker, but also to identify the limits of existing approaches to advance technology.  
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munication （RF）, passive components, sensing and actu-
ating, and biological functions” that may not scale with 
Moore’s Law and/or may employ non-CMOS solutions, 
that is, system-in-package （SiP） products to become 
increasingly important. The keyword to both axes was 
integration because most market segments were 
demanding more functions on very small platforms, and 
the most obvious and direct solution was to eliminate 
bulky packaging.
　The formulation of the “More Moore”-“More Than 
Moore” discussion framework is illustrative of the 
dynamics that vitalized the ITRS efforts. Discussions on 
Radio Frequency （RF） and Analog/Mixed-Signal Tech-
nologies （AMS） and non-CMOS device technologies had 
their roots in the Process Integration, Devices and Struc-
tures （PIDS） technology working group. RF and AMS 
was driven by the rapidly growing wireless communica-
tion market where industry led the introduction of IC 
chips for analog processing of RF signals using non-
CMOS processes and intermediate frequency （IF） sig-
nals using CMOS-compatible processes. Non-CMOS was 
driven by the urgency to find solutions to scaling beyond 
the 45-nm technology node, which in 2005, was a com-
plete redbrick wall extending over all PIDS technology 
requirements. The discussions culminated in extended 
sections on Wireless and Emerging Research Devices 
（ERD） added to the 2003 ITRS, and gave birth to above 
Fig. 3 in the 2005 ITRS. This bottom-up dynamics is 
clearly an important driving force that kept the ITRS 
relevant.
4   Evaluating the Impact: Successes and 
Failures
　The impact of the ST-Roadmaps is well expressed by 
these words from the Introduction to the 2005 ITRS, 
which said the ITRS “has been an especially successful 
worldwide cooperation. It presents an industry-wide con-
sensus on the “best current estimate” of the industry’s 
research and developments needs out to a 15-year hori-
zon. As such it provides a guide to the efforts of compa-
nies, research organizations, and governments. The ITRS 
has improved the quality of R&D investment decisions 
made at all levels and has helped channel research 
efforts to areas that truly need research breakthroughs.”
　〈Pace-setter〉
　As the industry’s pace-setter it maintained the com-
plexity trend predicted by Moore’s Law for almost 25 
years, which in turn kept the improvement trends going 
for cost, speed, power, compactness and functionality. Is 
Moore’s Law a self-fulfilling prophecy as some critics 
claimed? Some insights into the difficulties faced by 
industry may be found in the 1994 NTRS.
1.  Industrial research laboratories faced diminishing 
funds for long term advanced research needed to 
maintain momentum, because of requirements to 
show clear return on investment, resulting in major 
gaps in the US infrastructure.
2.  Escalating costs of research facilities were making it 
difficult for universities to invest in state-of-the-art 
wafer fabrication or advanced lithography programs.
3.  Software engineering and cross-discipline technology 
optimization required cultural change to correct 
deficiency to produce high-quality software.
The problem was not one of technical capability but one 
about competitiveness. Spending enormous amounts of 
capital on R&D may maintain Moore’s Law but also 
leaves an enormous problem in recovering the invest-
ment and weakens the company. The ST-Roadmaps 
helped to maintain or enhance competitiveness by 
encouraging information sharing that in turn saved costs. 
At the same time, accurate information from consensus 
among top experts helped management make better 
judgements for R&D investments.
　〈Technology Breakthroughs〉
　Another success that deserves mention is finding solu-
tions that broke through redbrick walls. The ST-Road-
maps identified where redbrick walls existed and helped 
critics claimed? Some insights into the difficulties faced by industry may be found in the 
1994 NTRS.  
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channel resources to tackle them in a timely manner. As 
the example of DRAM cell size shows, the accuracy may 
be poor at first so sufficient lead-time is important. For 
the ST-Roadmaps, 12-15 years was typical for break-
throughs to be found and solutions to be readied for 
mass production. Some examples are given in Fig. 4.
　〈Pitfalls〉
　The ST-Roadmaps also contained pitfalls. It should be 
remembered that milestones were meant only for the 
industry. Individual companies may find keeping the 
evolution pace set by the ST-Roadmaps a feat beyond 
their strength. Multi-billion capital investments every 
three years can be afforded only by the largest compa-
nies that had annual business volumes of several billions 
each. Even at slower evolution pace, huge investments 
were accompanied by huge risks. The growing demand 
for CMOS IC chips at first allowed many companies to 
risk building expensive fabrication facilities （fabs）. In the 
late 1980’s rising costs led to the birth of pure-play fabs 
that do not design circuits and design houses that do not 
manufacture chips.
　Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company 
（TSMC）, starting business in 1987, was the first pure-
play fab. Its greatest difference from historical semicon-
ductor producers, which operate as Integrated Device 
Manufacturers （IDMs） that design, manufacture and sell 
semiconductor IC products, is in providing only manufac-
turing services. At first TSMC provided processes that 
were 2 generations older than the most advanced IDMs, 
but it caught up after 10 years. Fabless companies or 
design houses that outsource their manufacturing 
requirements can enjoy the benefits of using the most 
advanced process for best performance, or using older 
processes for inexpensive IC chips, without heavy capital 
investments in expensive fabricating facilities. TSMC, by 
catering to the needs of many customers making prod-
ucts for a wide variety of markets, ensures high usage 
rate of its lines even if some customers do not sell well, 
thereby reducing risks. IDMs in contrast bear both the 
risk of high-cost fabrication facilities and the risk of poor 
sales of its products.
　The top 10 fabless companies in 2017
10
 included 6 U.S. 
companies, 1 Singapore company （Broadcom originally 
had its headquarters in the U.S. but moved to Singa-
pore）, 1 Taiwanese company and 2 Chinese companies. 
Three among the top 5 were incorporated later than 
1990. In general, fabless companies performed better 
than IDMs, except during years when memory chips 
had exceptionally strong demand.
　The strong performances of pure-play fabs and fabless 
companies demonstrate a growing trend of the semicon-
ductor industry as Rock’s Law progresses with Moore’s 
Law. Advanced fabrication facilities become concen-
trated among the top companies. Many IDMs cannot 
afford to upgrade their fabrication facilities even though 
they slowly become obsolete. To survive, companies can-
not have a narrow objective of achieving Moore’s Law at 
any cost.
5  Discussion and Conclusion
　The ST-Roadmaps probably have no parallel in their 
scope and scale of industry level research cooperation. 
They provide an interesting subject or material for stud-
ies on MOT. Many other research and/or industry con-
sortia have been formed to enhance technology and 
other common goals within an industry. However, most 
of them do not open their publications to the public or 
they do not have roadmaps or their scopes are limited to 
narrow topics. Published reports of the ST-Roadmaps are 
in-detail documents that have several hundred pages, 
most of which contain technical details but also lengthy 
portions that include explanations of the rationale, notes 
about why and how changes have been made, and sug-
gestions/cautions about how the information should be 
used. The ST-Roadmaps and revisions had been pub-
lished 10 times over a period of almost 25 years, there-
fore, offer a rare chance to study the effectiveness of 
using roadmaps in MOT.
　The ST-Roadmaps function as a MOT tool for indus-
try-level open cooperation. Some of the most significant 
features are listed below.
1.  They provide a shared vision that motivates 
researchers and focuses their efforts towards com-
mon goals.
2.  They provide accurate information, from consensus 
among many top experts, about the state-of-art, 
what technology levels are required and when in 
the future, the readiness of technologies required, 
where solutions have not been found, what alterna-
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tive technologies are promising, and how fast tech-
nology can advance.
3.  They act as a pace-setter that provides quantitative 
milestones for overall targets as well as lower level 
technologies and coordinates R&D among inter-
related technologies.
4.  They list requirements for all key technologies so as 
to identify gaps that need more attention or provide 
opportunities from novel ideas. Examples of gaps 
are cross-cut technologies that had not been given 
much attention before. The ST-Roadmaps’ documen-
tation claimed that such gap technologies would be 
provided better research funding although no detail 
was given.
　The ST-Roadmaps are, in several important aspects, 
different from roadmaps that are typical of company 
R&D management.
1.  They were formulated to achieve only Moore’s Law, 
or at least that was the only objective initially. The 
pace of technological evolution was independent of 
market fluctuations. It is noted that when milestones 
turned out to be more difficult than initially pro-
jected, roadmap pace had been suitably delayed. It 
was not like true MOT that must consider market 
opportunities and threats, such as in a SWOT 
review, when companies plot long-term investment 
plans. In the ST-Roadmaps, maintaining Moore’s 
Law was the ultimate aim. It may even be pointed 
out that the headlong rush to maintain Moore’s Law 
momentum could have been a factor that aggra-
vated spiraling high costs. It should be added that 
the only market information were descriptions of 
market drivers （broad market segments） within the 
topic of system drivers. In the almost 25-year his-
tory, categories in both system drivers and market 
drivers went through minor revisions a few times to 
align with new market segments or trends.
2.  They identified technological needs but were not 
accompanied by execution plans. No person nor 
organization was tasked to achieve the milestones. 
R&D investments were left entirely to companies, 
academic institutions, national laboratories and other 
R&D funding programs. The “R&D cooperation” is 
limited to obtaining consensus about technological 
needs, state of readiness of solutions, and the pace of 
evolution. It may be argued that absence of execu-
tion planning helped to avoid “not my job” kind of 
mental blocks to the search for solutions, or “protec-
tionistic” reactions to adverse critical assessments. 
The Roadmap played the role of a neutral technol-
ogy consultant who evaluated objectively and with-
out bias.
3.  The published ST-Roadmaps were open to anyone 
who was interested. In-depth technical details were 
shared at workshops among contributors and other 
participants, many of who belonged to rival compa-
nies. The objective was to facilitate cooperation for 
future R&D execution plans, but specific cooperation 
agreements were outside the roadmapping scope. 
Open discussion, furthermore encouraged voicing of 
more ideas and reduced biased pre-conceptions.
4.  ST-Roadmaps’ projections of technology require-
ments were based purely on scientific and engineer-
ing knowledge, hence, milestones in the near term 
were not affected by uncertain factors such as mar-
ket demand and competition. On the other hand, 
readiness information depended on the opinions of 
top experts who might be wrong, inaccurate or mis-
leading. Consensus from a pool of many top experts, 
who brought to the discussion a variety of experi-
ence and knowledge, under conditions unbiased by 
non-technical considerations, should give more accu-
rate assessments compared to the situation in a 
company setting.
　A clear picture of what the ST-Roadmaps were and 
were not can be seen from the published documentation. 
The more important question, whether and how did they 
contribute to the semiconductor industry, can only be 
answered partially, based on circumstantial evidence 
from the electronics industry. The history of the elec-
tronics market offers some clues. Electronics products 
that use the products of the semiconductor industry 
often follow a product evolution pattern that starts with 
corporate customers who demand high performance, fol-
lowed by a wider market who can pay less but are satis-
fied with lower performance such as small businesses 
and families, and finally spreads to individual customers 
who demand small portable products. An example is the 
digital computer which evolved from large computers 
for business information processing, to office computers 
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for office information processing, to personal computers 
for each employee and family, and finally to smartphones 
for each individual. Another example is the video 
recorder/player, which evolved from specialist equip-
ment, to family consumer product, to individual con-
sumer products first as DVD players, and today 
integrated into smartphones. The semiconductor market 
for these products grow in volume, and often towards 
smaller, less bulky, less heavy, and low power consump-
tion versions. What started as many circuit boards in 
large cabinets, evolved to a few circuit boards in side-
cabinet-size units and desktop units, to single boards in 
laptops, notebooks, tablets and smartphones. Semicon-
ductors makers must always push the performance 
envelop for products that can do more, use less power 
and have smaller form factors. The market for semicon-
ductors is strongly technology-driven and new products 
soon find use in a variety of new applications. The strat-
egy followed in the Roadmap to maintain Moore’s Law is 
exactly what the industry needs. It must be added 
though that the actual rate achieved was 2-fold every 
two years instead of the target 4-fold every three years.
　In the previous section, it had been noted that the 
2005 ITRS documentation claimed the ITRS “has been 
an especially successful worldwide cooperation.” This 
reputation is attested to by the large number of top 
experts who contributed to revising the roadmaps. If the 
roadmapping exercise had been meaningless, few top 
experts would spend time away from their jobs. The 
importance industry placed on the ITRS roadmap is evi-
dent from the large fraction of contributors from indus-
try （73% in 2005 ITRS）, Fig. 5.
　A cause-effect relationship between the ST-Roadmaps 
and progress of the semiconductor industry, however, 
remains difficult to demonstrate. Although they defined 
the milestones to achieve Moore performance growth 
rate, they did not participate in R&D. In the PDCA cycle 
view of managerial actions, “D” was conducted by 
researchers in many organizations, a large number com-
pared to about 1000 contributors to the ST-Roadmaps. 
Revising the roadmap every two years gave a chance for 
R&D results to be fed back to the contributors who 
could then evaluate the viability and/or readiness of can-
didate solutions.
　A related question is: did the ST-Roadmaps give posi-
tive impact on the businesses of individual companies? 
As explained above, R&D funding fell outside the pur-
view of the ST-Roadmaps. Companies or business units, 
in the case of large corporations, had to seek funds on 
their own merits, and get ready required technologies. 
However, the ST-Roadmaps only provided information 
for companies to plan ahead but how the information 
impacted individual businesses differed greatly. Manage-
rial decisions in semiconductor companies to invest in 
new technologies might have been made using informa-
tion from the ST-Roadmaps, but the outcomes of those 
decisions were affected by many other factors, such as 
market demand, company strengths and weaknesses, 
and competition, which together determined in a com-
plex manner the degree of success, so that causal effect 
from one factor is difficult to demonstrate.
　What does the long term trend data of semiconductor 
market offers some clues. Electronics products that use the products of the 
semiconductor industry often follow a product evolution pattern that starts with 
corporate customers who demand high performance, followed by a wider market who can 
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sales show?
　The compound annual growth rate （CAGR） of the 
semiconductor industry between 1996 and 2016 was 
4.8%/year according to the World Semiconductor Trade 
Statistics （WSTS） and SIA estimates, reaching US$346b 
in 2017, Fig. 6. This is below typical GDP growth rates of 
emerging economies and above those of developed econ-
omies. Although number of chips might have increased 
much more, falling prices suppressed the total sale value.
　The market shares between top producing regions, 
however, showed trends different from the global sales 
trend, Fig. 7. The US market share, after being over-
taken by Japan in the late 1980’s, regained top position 
by the early 1990’s and maintained roughly the same 
share since mid-1990’s. On the other hand, Japan’s mar-
ket share declined almost continuously for 30 years, 
despite being a technology leader in semiconductors. 
The ST-Roadmaps provide information for “how” to 
make state-of-art semiconductors but not how to succeed 
in competing against others who have the same informa-
tion.
　Further research using company histories regarding 
investments in semiconductor technologies would be 
needed to clarify why business performances differed so 
greatly among companies and even among countries.
Conclusion
　This paper looked into the impact of ST-Roadmaps on 
the semiconductor industry by examining their role as a 
MOT tool. The biannually revised reports provided pri-
mary source information. It was found that the ST-Road-
maps only considered technological needs for achieving 
Moore’s Law but disregarded other factors such as mar-
ket and competition. The ST-Roadmaps represented the 
consensus among top experts about key semiconductor 
technologies and were highly regarded by the semicon-
ductor community. Although R&D execution was con-
ducted by others, the ST-Roadmaps gave a common 
vision and challenging targets that guided and paced 
R&D to find timely solutions to satisfy market demands. 
The fact that ST-Roadmaps did not include non-technical 
considerations suggests that they may provide unique 
insights for research to clarify the separate contributions 
of technical and non-technical factors to MOT effective-
ness.
 
 
Fig. 6 Annual Global Semiconductor Sales 1996 – 2016 [12] 
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Fig. 7 Market share trends of major semiconductor prod cing regions in 2016 [12] 
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